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Abstract 
 
This paper presents findings on the changing effectiveness of cash transfers and 
income taxes on inequality and poverty reduction in four EU countries – the UK, 
Italy, Sweden and France. We use long time series (spanning four decades) to 
examine trends within countries over time and between countries at different 
points in time. Recent evidence has suggested that the relationship between 
concentration of cash transfers and their redistributive effectiveness has become 
blurred over time. We find much more conclusive evidence of a negative 
relationship within countries over time. The results show a negative relationship 
between the concentration of cash transfers net of direct taxes and their 
effectiveness in terms of reducing poverty and inequality. The strength of the 
relationship varies between countries and in some cases between the all age and 
the working age populations. The evidence suggests that caution should be applied 
to relying on bivariate cross-country estimates and that more should be done to 
establish and verify empirical relationships within countries over time using the 
rich data sources that are now available. These findings re-open the debate on the 
most effective design of cash transfer and direct tax systems.  
 
Keywords: Inequality, poverty, redistribution, cash transfers, welfare  
JEL code: I32, H2 
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1. Introduction 
 
The relationship between the degree of targeting of cash transfers and their 
effectiveness in producing a more equitable distribution of income has been the 
focus of a number of research papers. Arguably the most influential in this field is 
the paper by Korpi and Palme (1998) which presented empirical cross-country 
estimates suggesting that more targeted cash transfers systems were less effective 
in terms of reducing inequality than more universal systems. Recent evidence has 
challenged this finding (Marx, Salanauskaite and Verbist, 2013; Kenworthy, 
2011). These more recent studies have shown that with a wider selection of 
countries than that used by Korpi and Palme and more recent observations, the 
relationship is much less conclusive and in many cases no longer holds.  
 
The policy interest in understanding the relationship between concentration of cash 
transfers (most commonly operationalised through means-testing) and 
redistributive effectiveness intensifies the need for clear answers. The finding that 
welfare systems which deliver more concentrated cash transfers are less effective 
at reducing poverty and inequality, as Korpi and Palme acknowledge, might appear 
to be counterintuitive. They refer to it as a “Paradox”. The argument that limited 
resources should be focused on those most in need has intuitive appeal. Korpi and 
Palme, and others, argue that a more inclusive welfare state based around a 
universal system of entitlements leads to wider support among the electorate, 
producing a sustainable, generous system of cash transfers and this is key to 
understanding why they deliver lower poverty and inequality despite some 
‘inefficiencies’. The authors who conducted the more recent research which finds 
a breakdown in the relationship also stress the importance of a ‘generous’ system 
of cash transfers (Marx et al., 2013). 
 
In this paper we take a new approach, rather than simply comparing the bivariate 
relationship between the concentration of cash transfers and their redistributive 
impact across a number of countries at different points in time we focus on four 
countries with contrasting welfare systems. This allows us to provide an in-depth 
analysis of the evolution of welfare systems in these countries using a long time 
series (spanning four decades) to examine trends within countries over time and 
between countries at different points in time. 
2.   Motivation and existing evidence 
Cash transfers are made for a number of reasons. As Hills (2014) outlines it is not 
simply that welfare states redistribute income from those who are well-off to those 
who are disadvantaged (labelled the “Robin Hood” objective by Barr (2001)) but 
to a large extent to assist individuals and families in smoothing income between 
periods of their lives when income is relatively high to periods when it is lower 
(through unemployment or retirement, for example) or when needs are greater 
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(raising a young family) (labelled the “Piggy Bank” objective by Barr (2001)). The 
balance between these two objectives does vary between countries and there is 
some evidence that countries with greater targeting do less in terms of 
redistribution across the lifecycle and conversely countries with a higher degree of 
targeting cash transfers to low-income households are more redistributive 
(Ståhlberg, 2007). So at least to some degree an assessment of the effectiveness of 
the net cash transfer system not only tells us the extent to which the welfare state 
reduces inequality and the incidence of poverty between individuals and their 
families at a point in time but it also tells us about the effectiveness of the system 
in terms of smoothing our own income over the lifecycle between times of relative 
need and relative plenty.  
 
The rise in income inequality within many rich countries over the past four decades 
has increasingly attracted attention and raised concerns (Salverda et al., 2014; 
OECD, 2008; OECD, 2011; Brandolini and Smeeding, 2009; Stiglitz, 2012). Not 
only does rising income inequality portray an increase in the dispersion of 
economic and monetary resources but evidence suggests that higher income 
inequality is associated with greater inequalities in other domains (Salverda et al., 
2014; Hills et al., 2010). This is hardly surprising given that money is used by 
individuals and families to secure better outcomes. The effectiveness of welfare 
states in terms of reducing inequality and the incidence of poverty is not simply of 
academic interest as understanding differences can help to improve the functioning 
of welfare states. Whiteford (2008) outlines how understanding the redistributive 
effectiveness of different systems can help the design of policies and their mix, 
particularly where governments are seeking to reform welfare systems. 
 
The debate between those who argue for more or less targeting of cash transfers 
has a long history and is ongoing. Although this controversy did not start with 
Korpi and Palme’s 1998 work it can certainly be regarded as a seminal 
contribution. They conclude their cross-country analysis by outlining what they 
note can appear to be counterintuitive to some:– “The paradox of redistribution: 
The more we target benefits at the poor only and the more concerned we are with 
creating equality via equal public transfers to all, the less likely we are to reduce 
poverty and inequality” (Korpi and Palme, 1998). Of course this was not the end 
of the debate but it was largely left unchallenged, at least empirically, until very 
recently. In 2011 Kenworthy updated Korpi and Palme’s analysis using 
observations for the 1990s and 2000s and he concludes that the negative 
relationship between targeting and redistribution was less clear by 1995 and no 
longer evident by 2000/2005 (Kenworthy, 2011). 
 
Marx, Salanauskaite and Verbist (2013) conduct an extensive analysis using the 
same set of countries as that examined by Korpi and Palme and supplementary 
analysis using a wider set of countries for which more recent data are now 
available. They conclude that the strong inverse relationship identified by Korpi 
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and Palme no longer holds as a robust empirical generalisation. They suggest that 
this is to do with the selection of countries, the time period studied and aspects of 
the empirical specification. All three studies examine the relationship between 
targeting (concentration) and redistributive impact by comparing this bivariate 
relationship across countries. They are all in agreement that the generosity of the 
cash transfer system is a key contributory factor just as Kakwani highlighted before 
them that not just the degree of tax progressivity but also the average tax rate 
matters in terms redistribution (Kakwani, 1977).  It is noteworthy that the extensive 
new analysis in Kenworthy (2011) and Marx, Salanauskaite and Verbist (2013) 
does not show the positive relationship between targeting and poverty or inequality 
reduction that might be naively expected. 
 
The existing research has focused on comparing a set of countries at a point in time 
or at two or three points in time even though the debate on means-testing and 
progressive taxation is generally concerned with over time hypotheses. As 
Glennerster (2014) points out, Titmuss argued the case that “separate 
discriminatory services for poor people have always tended to be poor services” 
(or low benefit ones). Over time, he claims, it becomes easier to cut services and 
cash transfers for disadvantaged people, as the ‘blame’ for their predicament can 
be levelled at their inaction, when the majority of the electorate don’t directly 
benefit. However, there is an alternative view suggesting that a targeted cash 
transfer system is more likely to be supported by the electorate based on the notion 
that money is ‘wasted’ on non-poor people in a universal system and therefore will 
receive less electoral support.  The social legitimacy of differently targeted benefits 
is reviewed by van Oorschot and Roosma (2015) who highlight the vulnerability 
of narrowly targeted benefits overall and particularly during periods of austerity. 
Another way in which the concentration of cash transfers can affect re-distributive 
effectiveness is through reduced take-up resulting from the stigma felt by those 
who are entitled to receive such transfers. Such arguments were put forward by 
Beveridge and Townsend and this may have changed over time but static analysis 
is unable to pick up any differences.  
 
Welfare state provision not only affects post transfer behaviour and income but the 
existence and design of cash transfers can directly alter people’s behaviour. 
Behavioural changes can affect the distribution of market income (pre-tax and 
transfer income) by either creating a disincentive for individuals to make 
alternative provisions for periods of loss of income (such as unemployment 
insurance or private pension provision) or simply deterring personal savings 
(especially where savings are included in a means-test). Also a cash transfer 
system that supplements low wages (such as housing subsidies and tax-credits paid 
to those in work) can distort the market by making it financially viable for workers 
to accept low paid jobs and incentivises employers to create jobs which are 
effectively subsidised by the welfare state. 
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All of these debates consider how welfare state regimes and the redistributive 
effectiveness of net cash transfer systems evolve over time. A static analysis would 
have to assume that a point in time represents a long-run equilibrium or steady-
state but this is unlikely to be the case as cash transfers and taxation policy evolves 
under different governments and in response to the economic cycle. For example, 
unemployment reduces the market income of some individuals and the payment of 
unemployment benefit increases measures of redistributive effectiveness so 
comparing a set of countries at a point in time will be affected by the extent to 
which unemployment varies between countries as well as the redistributive 
effectiveness of unemployment benefit. It therefore makes much more sense to 
approach the topic by comparing the evolution of these trends and the relationships 
between them within and then between countries. 
 
A recent review of the international evidence concludes that despite a considerable 
volume of research the universal versus means-tested debate is far from resolved 
(Gugushvili and Hirsch, 2014). In this paper we take a new approach which 
provides additional insight into the apparent changing relationship between the 
concentration of cash transfers and their redistributive effectiveness. 
3.   Approach and methodology 
We largely follow the methodology previously adopted in the literature. This 
involves estimating the concentration of cash transfers and relating these figures 
to estimates of poverty and inequality reduction. Although Korpi and Palme 
motivate their analysis in terms of comparing countries classified according to 
different welfare regime types, based on entitlement to different benefits, in 
practice the empirical component of their paper simply compares countries based 
on the empirical estimates of cash transfer concentration. Marx et al.(2013) and 
Kenworthy (2011) also adopt this empirical approach. While simple, there are a 
number of important underlying assumptions regarding the counterfactual 
distributions of household income and counterfactual poverty rates which we 
discuss below. 
 
Our measure of ‘targeting’ is the concentration coefficient, which in construction 
is closely related to the Gini coefficient, the difference being that the measure of 
income used to rank income units is different from that used to assess the 
distribution of income across ranked households/individuals. For the Gini 
coefficient the same measure of income is used to both rank individuals and to 
compute the share of income going to ranked positions. We rank individuals 
according to their household equivalised market income (income from 
employment, capital (including voluntary individual pensions) and private 
transfers), and estimate the share of net cash transfers received within ranked 
positions. 
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As outlined in Van Kerm (2010) the Gini and concentration coefficient can be 
formulated in terms of covariance expressions: 
 where X is a random variable of interest with mean μ(X), and F(X) is its cumulative 
distribution function. The Concentration coefficient measures the association 
between two random variables and can be expressed as: 
 
where G(Y) is the cumulative distribution function of Y. CONC(X, Y) reflects 
how much X is concentrated on observations with high ranks in Y. Smaller (more 
negative) values are related to higher degrees of concentration or ‘targeting’.  
The choice of the counterfactual distribution (Y) is important as it represents 
income and its distribution that is assumed to prevail in the absence of a welfare 
state (pre cash transfers, social contributions and income taxes). 
We use two outcome measures to assess effectiveness. (1) An estimate of 
inequality reduction arising from the net cash transfer system which is measured 
as the difference in the Gini coefficient before and after net cash transfers. (2) An 
estimate of poverty reduction measured by the difference in poverty rates before 
and after net cash transfers. 
 
We use the ‘at risk of’ income poverty rate measured by the proportion of 
individuals with income below 60% of median income. Household income is 
equivalised using the square root of household size (including children) and the 
unit of analysis is the individual. 
 
Throughout we use market income and its distribution as the counterfactual. The 
assumption here is that market income is a reliable measure of what household 
income would be in the absence of direct taxes and gross cash transfers. This, of 
course, is unlikely to hold in practice as in the absence of a welfare state individuals 
and families would make alternative decisions/provision; unemployment 
insurance, pension provision and labour supply behaviour are likely to be affected. 
The underlying assumptions that there is no behavioural change related to the 
presence of targeted cash transfers or tax is unrealistic but it is not clear whether 
market income would be more or less equally distributed in their absence. 
Alternative counterfactual income measures such as gross income (market income 
plus gross cash transfers) and disposable income have also been used in the 
literature and evidence does show that the ranking of income units is affected by 
the choice of income measure but each measure has its advantages and 
disadvantages. As we are more interested in looking at changes overtime rather 
than the precise level this is less of an issue.  
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We present results for the all age population and the working age population (16-
64 years) separately to exclude the age group for whom market income is least 
likely to provide a true counterfactual due to the dominant role of pensions.  
 
Four countries have been selected for this study spanning a number of different 
welfare state types. Italy, a Southern European country which still relies on a 
family-based welfare system, has an ageing population reliant on increasingly 
burdensome public pensions and an underdeveloped social assistance system. Out 
of the selection of countries Italy has the lowest rates of employment and the 
widest gender gap in employment. Expenditure on family and unemployment 
related cash transfers is relatively low in Italy. France is a member of the 
‘corporatist-statist’ welfare regimes according to Esping-Andersen’s typology 
(Esping-Andersen, 1990). France has the highest share of tax revenue collected 
through social security contributions, not just out of the selected countries but 
across the OECD. The reliance on social security contributions results in a tax 
system which is considerably less progressive than other systems where income 
tax plays a larger role. The French welfare state offers a minimum income, a fairly 
generous system of family benefits (cash transfers and tax deductions) and an 
earnings related unemployment benefit. Similar to Italy, social expenditure on old 
age pensions dominates and has increased dramatically in recent years. Sweden is 
by far the smallest country of the four with a population of around 10 million 
compared to about 60 million in the other three. Sweden has traditionally been 
characterised as belonging to the ‘Social Democratic’ or ‘Nordic’ model of welfare 
with a large public sector and a large and active welfare state. However, since the 
early 1990s financial crisis Sweden has undertaken a series of reforms seeking to 
reduce the size of the welfare state. Changes in the tax system have made it less 
progressive and the generosity of unemployment insurance has been reduced. The 
United Kingdom is said to belong to a ‘liberal’ model of welfare regime types, 
characterised by a low tax and less generous welfare state. The UK has the second 
highest employment rates (behind Sweden) both overall and for women but by far 
the highest rate of women working part-time and the highest incidence of low-
wage employment. The UK has an established system of in-work benefits, made 
more generous with the introduction of tax credits in 1999 and through cash 
transfers to assist with housing costs. 
4.  Data 
The data used in this research are drawn from the Luxembourg Income Study (LIS) 
micro datasets. LIS is a database of national data sources including household 
surveys and extracts from administrative systems (register data). To assist cross 
country analysis, LIS have harmonised key variables although, inevitably, 
differences remain both between countries and within countries over time. Here 
we provide some information on the national data sources used and highlight 
factors that could affect our analysis.  
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UK data are from the Family Expenditure Survey until 1994 and from 1995 
onwards from the Family Resources Survey, both are annual household surveys. 
For France information is drawn from the Household Budget Survey (BdF). This 
survey collects information on net income but because income tax in France is not 
withheld at source but paid by annual tax return, all the amounts reported in the 
survey are net of mandatory contributions but gross of income tax. LIS uses an 
estimate of income tax based on income tax paid in the previous fiscal year to 
compute net household income. 
 
Italian data are drawn from the Survey of Household Income and Wealth (SHIW). 
Incomes are reported net of taxes and social contributions. Data on net personal 
income taxes and social security contributions have been imputed by the Bank of 
Italy (the data providers). This has implications for some of the analysis reported 
in this paper and is highlighted where relevant. 
 
Sweden is the only country in our sample for which income data is drawn from 
administrative data sources. Households in the Swedish dataset (HINK) were 
defined in terms of fiscal units up to 2000. The result is that children over the age 
of 16 still living with their parents were not included as household members but 
could appear in the survey as a separate household unit. In addition, non-married 
couples who don’t have children in common are counted as separate household 
units. The result is a larger number of households classified as single household 
units. This potentially has an impact on poverty and inequality measures as for 
some pooling of household resources and needs are not accounted for and children 
(16 years and older) who are still living with their parents are likely to appear to 
live in households with very little, if any, income. However, Fritzell et al. (2014) 
show that inequality measures using the old and new definitions are very similar 
and therefore this is unlikely to lead to any great discontinuity. 
 
Table 1: Survey years available from the LIS database used in the analysis 
 1970s 1980s 1990s 2000s 
 
    
UK 1974, 1979 1986 1991, 1994, 1995, 
1999 
2004, 2007, 
2010 
Italy  1986, 1987, 
1989 
1991, 1993, 1995, 
1998 
2000, 2004, 
2008, 2010 
France  1984, 1989 1994 2000, 2005, 
2010 
Sweden 1975 1981, 1987 1992, 1995 2000, 2005 
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5. Trends in income poverty, inequality and the concentration of cash 
transfers 
 
We begin by examining within country trends in poverty rates (measured before 
and after net cash transfers) and the concentration of gross and net cash transfers. 
The examination of gross and net cash transfers allows us to assess changes in the 
progressivity of cash transfers and direct taxes1 separately as here we define 
household net cash transfers as gross cash transfers net of all direct taxes. 
Ultimately it is the combined effect of cash transfers and direct taxes that determine 
the redistributive effectiveness of the system. 
 
In the UK we observe a reduction in the concentration of net cash transfers which 
has been driven by a reduction in tax progressivity (Figure 1). Gross cash transfers 
became less concentrated between 1974 and 1979 but then increased in 
concentration between 1986 and 1991 and between 1995 and 2010, reflecting an 
increasing policy emphasis on focusing resources on those most in need and 
latterly with efforts to reduce the incidence of child poverty. The gap between the 
concentration of gross and net cash transfers widened between 1974 and 1979 and 
then narrowed reflecting a fall in the progressive incidence of direct taxes. Poverty 
rates increased in the UK with much greater increases for market income than for 
disposable income measures demonstrating the effectiveness of net cash transfers 
in keeping poverty rates down. The fact that disposable income poverty rates did 
increase, particularly over the period 1974-1991, shows that net cash transfers 
were not enough to fully offset the increase in the incidence of market income 
poverty. 
 
In France a shorter time series is available (1984-2010). In the computation of the 
concentration coefficients household income is ranked on the basis of gross market 
income net of mandatory social contributions. To the extent that these are 
progressive, concentration coefficients will be lower than if household income was 
ranked on the basis of gross market income. The concentration of cash transfers 
follows no distinct trend over this period and there is very little difference between 
the concentration of gross and net cash transfers. This is because income in the 
French survey is reported gross of taxes but net of social contributions and the fact 
that France has the highest share of tax revenue collected through social security 
contributions across the OECD (40%) (OECDstat). This finding is also consistent 
with recent evidence which concludes that the French tax system is not progressive 
(Frémeaux and Piketty, 2014). Market income (net of compulsory social 
contributions) poverty rates increased marginally (there was also little change in 
UK rates over this time period) but disposable income poverty rates fell 
1  Ideally measures of indirect taxes would also be included but this information is not 
available in the data source. 
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(particularly over the period 1989-1994) demonstrating an increase in the 
effectiveness of the French net cash transfer system (effectively gross cash 
transfers) in terms of reducing the incidence of poverty. 
 
In Sweden the concentration of net cash transfers increased between 1975 and 
1981 but the concentration of gross cash transfers changed very little indicating an 
increase in the progressivity of income tax (Figure 1). Subsequently, the 
concentration of net cash transfers fell quite dramatically between 1981 and 1995; 
in particular between 1981 and 1987 and again steeply between 1992 and 1995 
(over the Swedish financial crisis in the early 1990s) with little change in the 
concentration of gross cash transfers over this period. This implies that income tax 
became less progressive and this is consistent with the reforms made over this 
period (Fritzell et al., 2014). Between 2000 and 2005 the concentration of net cash 
transfers increased once again. Market income poverty rates increased fairly 
dramatically in Sweden between 1975 and 1995 but disposable income poverty 
rates actually declined slightly as a result of net cash transfers more than offsetting 
the increase in market income poverty rates. Between 1995 and 2000 market 
income poverty rates fell while disposable income poverty rates increased and this 
narrowing between the two rates indicates that the net cash transfer system became 
less effective at combating poverty; no change in the concentration of gross or net 
cash transfers over this period points to a less generous system. 
 
As income for Italy in the LIS database is reported net of taxes and social 
contributions, individual household income is ranked according to net rather than 
gross market income for the computation of concentration coefficients. Because 
income tax is progressive this means that cash transfers will be less concentrated 
in net market income terms than for gross market income. In Italy the concentration 
of gross cash transfers decreased between 1989 and 1995 followed by an increase 
between 1998 and 2004; the concentration of gross cash transfers in 2004 was very 
similar to 1989. Information on imputed taxes and social contributions is only 
made available through LIS from 2004 in the Italian data series and therefore it is 
not possible to analyse differences in the trends between gross and net. In Italy as 
income is reported net of taxes and social contributions, net market income is 
shown in Figure 1 and therefore the difference between net market income and 
disposable income is accounted for by the impact of cash transfers only. Market 
income and disposable income poverty rates increased between 1989 and 1993. 
Over the whole period for which data is available for Italy (1987-2010) there is an 
increase in the gap between (net) market income and disposable income poverty 
rates indicating that cash transfers became more effective at reducing the incidence 
of income poverty. 
 
Comparing the four countries we find that from around 1990 all countries have 
very similar market income poverty rates at around 40%, although lower in 
Sweden from around 2000 at about 34% (Figure 1). The gap between market 
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income poverty rates and disposable income poverty rates is highest in France 
(although note that market income is reported net of mandatory social 
contributions) where net cash transfers reduced poverty rates by around 30 
percentage points in 2005. The concentration of net cash transfers decreased in the 
UK and Sweden, although the concentration increased in Sweden in the most 
recent years 2000-2005.  
 
Figure 1: Trends in poverty rates (vertical axis – positive scale) and 
concentration of cash transfers (vertical axis – negative scale) (all age) 
 
 
 
 
Notes: (1) For Italy, market income is reported net of taxes and social contributions. This means 
that the difference between market and disposable income represents the effect of cash transfers 
only. From 2004 imputed income tax and social security contributions are reported allowing for 
an estimate of net and gross cash transfers to be included. For the computation of concentration 
coefficients, income is ranked on the basis of net rather than gross market income. (2) For France, 
the measure for market income is net of compulsory mandatory social contributions. Income tax 
for the previous fiscal year is used to estimate disposable income.  
 
Source: Author’s calculations based on data from the Luxembourg Income Study 
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The series in Figure 2 are restricted to the working age population (16-64 years) 
and therefore largely exclude the effects of cash transfers in the form of pensions. 
Using market income as counterfactual income is arguably the least realistic for 
those reliant on pensions. The concentration of gross cash transfers is similar to 
that shown for the all age population but higher for net cash transfers among the 
working age population. This is because income tax among the working age 
population is more progressive, reflecting the higher tax liabilities of the working 
age population, demonstrated by the larger gap between the concentration of gross 
and net cash transfers in the working age population than in the all age population. 
Market income poverty rates are lower among the working age population 
highlighting the point made about the importance of pensions in the population 
over working age. The gaps between market income poverty rates and disposable 
income poverty rates are much smaller in the working age population as net cash 
transfers play a smaller role in poverty reduction in the working age population 
(again reflecting the importance of pensions). It is notable that the gap between 
market income and disposable income poverty rates is particularly small in Italy; 
no doubt a result of the fact that the Italian welfare state has much more limited 
provision of cash transfers for the working age population and the domination of 
pensions for those over working age. The overall pattern of trends in concentration 
and poverty rates between the all age and the working age populations is very 
similar across these four countries. 
 
It is well-documented that income inequality in the UK increased over the 40 years 
since 1970, with much of the increase occurring over the 1980s (McKnight and 
Tsang, 2014). While inequality increased in market income and disposable income, 
the increase was greater for market income (48% versus 33% increase; 18 Gini 
points versus 9 Gini points) (Figure 3). This suggests that the net cash transfer 
system became more effective in terms of reducing income inequality. This could 
be due to changes in factors affecting market income inequality such as 
unemployment and earnings inequality as well as increases in disability and the 
growth in disability-related benefits and housing benefits. In Sweden inequality of 
market income increased in the first half of the 1990s; a period over which the 
concentration of net cash transfers fell2. However inequality in disposable income 
didn’t increase until the second half of the 1990s when inequality in market income 
actually fell. 
 
In France the inequality of disposable income and market income fell between 
1984 and 1989 but thereafter remained fairly stable through to 2010. Inequality in 
market and disposable income dipped temporarily in Italy between 1986 and 1991 
and inequality in market income continued to increase gradually through to 2004, 
although inequality in disposable income remained fairly flat. 
2  These inequality rates are lower than those reported in some other studies but the 
trends are the same (Fritzell et al., 2014).  
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Figure 2: Trends in poverty rates (vertical axis – positive scale) and 
concentration of cash transfers (vertical axis – negative scale) (working age) 
 
 
 
 
Source: Author’s calculations based on data from the Luxembourg Income Study 
Notes (see Figure 1 notes) 
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Figure 3: Trends in inequality in market and disposable income (Gini 
coefficients) (vertical axis – positive scale) and concentration of gross and net 
cash transfers (vertical axis – negative scale) (all age population) 
 
 
Source: Author’s calculations based on data from the Luxembourg Income Study 
Notes (see Figure 1 notes) 
 
Inequality in market income is lower in the working age population than the all age population 
and the difference between market income inequality and inequality in disposable incomes is much 
reduced as net cash transfers play a smaller redistributive role in the working age population 
(Figure 4). 
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Figure 4: Trends in inequality in market and disposable income (Gini 
coefficients) (vertical axis – positive scale)and concentration of gross and net 
cash transfers (vertical axis – negative scale) (working age) 
 
 
Notes (see Figure 1 notes) 
Source: Author’s calculations based on data from the Luxembourg Income Study 
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they are universal benefits or social assistance has changed over time within the 
four countries measured by concentration coefficients (Table 2). 
 
Social assistance is more concentrated although there are some exceptions where 
‘universal’ transfers are more concentrated than social assistance (eg France 1984 
and 1989) but it is likely to have arisen as a result of deficiencies in the data with 
information not always available for sub-components3 within transfer types. 
Changes in eligibility, the introduction of new cash transfers, welfare benefit 
reforms and changes in need (eg unemployment) are all likely to affect trends in 
the differences between the two types of cash transfer. For example the introduction 
of tax credits for low income working households in the UK resulted in cash 
transfers having greater reach up the income distribution than previous in-work 
benefits. This has had the effect of decreasing the concentration of social assistance. 
Among the all age population we observe fluctuations in the concentration of 
universal cash transfers over time. For the complete periods for which information 
is available we observe an increase in concentration in the UK but falls in France, 
Italy and Sweden. The concentration of universal cash transfers also fell among the 
working age population in France and Italy but increased in the UK and Sweden. 
A more mixed picture emerges with regards to changes in the concentration of 
social assistance. For the all age population concentration increased in Sweden, 
France and initially the UK (falling after the introduction of tax credits in 1999). In 
Italy the concentration of social assistance fluctuates over time4.  
 
This pattern within countries and across time is largely replicated for the working 
age population with a few exceptions. In Italy the concentration of social assistance 
fell overall in the working age population but large fluctuations over time suggests 
that there are some data quality issues. 
 
In the UK, France and Sweden the concentration of universal benefits is greater 
among the all age population than the working age population while the reverse is 
true for social assistance. In Italy there is a more mixed picture which changes over 
time.  
3  This is not a problem for the total values used in the main analysis. 
4  It is not clear if this is due to data coverage or policy. Italy lacks a national level social 
assistance programme and provision varies across regions. 
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Table 2: Concentration coefficients by type of cash transfer 
 All ages  Working age 
 
Gross  
universal 
Gross social 
assistance  
Gross 
universal 
Gross social 
assistance 
UK      
1979 -0.325 -0.454  -0.236 -0.513 
1986 -0.283 -0.561  -0.231 -0.621 
1991 -0.316 -0.696  -0.272 -0.762 
1994 -0.317 -0.647  -0.291 -0.715 
1995 -0.270 -0.664  -0.236 -0.714 
1999 -0.327 -0.656  -0.281 -0.722 
2004 -0.370 -0.573  -0.300 -0.656 
2007 -0.414 -0.478  -0.312 -0.597 
2010 -0.414 -0.438  -0.309 -0.560 
 
France      
1984 -0.429 -0.209  -0.432 -0.306 
1989 -0.437 -0.300  -0.402 -0.431 
1994 -0.408 -0.417  -0.366 -0.564 
2000 -0.426 -0.446  -0.366 -0.580 
2005 -0.407 -0.478  -0.374 -0.606 
2010 -0.401 -0.485  -0.342 -0.623 
 
Italy      
1987 -0.424 -0.466  -0.490 -0.585 
1989 -0.432 -0.472  -0.489 -0.537 
1991 -0.405 -0.462  -0.427 -0.532 
1993 -0.344 -0.454  -0.346 -0.485 
1995 -0.301 -0.330  -0.306 -0.121 
1998 -0.309 -0.349  -0.301 -0.117 
2000 -0.342 -0.496  -0.352 -0.227 
2004 -0.399 -0.530  -0.436 -0.575 
2008 -0.363 -0.529  -0.366 -0.363 
2010 -0.383 -0.488  -0.363 -0.358 
 
Sweden      
1975 -0.371 -0.353  -0.265 -0.459 
1981 -0.381 -0.390  -0.284 -0.525 
1987 -0.374 -0.390  -0.296 -0.542 
1992 -0.353 -0.505  -0.319 -0.619 
1995 -0.343 -0.539  -0.322 -0.631 
2000 -0.342 -0.666  -0.306 -0.764 
2005 -0.339 -0.706  -0.307 -0.805 
 
Notes (see Figure 1 notes). 1974 for the UK is not included due to missing components. 
Source: Author’s calculations based on data from the Luxembourg Income Study 
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7.  Assessing the effectiveness of cash transfers on poverty and inequality     
reduction 
In assessing the relationship between the concentration of net cash transfers and 
poverty rate reduction we could either examine the relationship between 
concentration and the percentage point change in poverty rates or the percentage 
change in poverty rates between market income and disposable income. Both of 
these measures are positively correlated with the initial at risk of poverty rate as 
there is greater scope for a reduction in poverty when rates are higher. The 
percentage reduction in poverty rates has the unattractive feature of giving equal 
weight to, for example, a halving of poverty rates from 10% to 5% or from 50% to 
25% while the percentage point reduction would give much greater weight to the 
25 percentage point reduction from 50% to 25% than the 5 percentage point 
reduction from 10% to 5%. Figure 5 shows how the percentage point reduction and 
the percentage reduction are correlated with the initial at risk of poverty rates using 
all of the observations we have across all four countries. 
 
Figure 5: Higher rates of poverty are associated with greater reductions in 
poverty 
(a) Percentage point reduction  (b) Percent reduction 
 
Notes (see Figure 1 notes). 
Source: Author’s calculations based on data from the Luxembourg Income Study 
 
For inequality we can use either the point reduction or the percentage reduction in 
the Gini coefficient between market income and disposable income. Figure 6(a) 
shows that a positive correlation exists between the initial level of inequality and 
the observed point reduction in the Gini coefficient. However, Figure 6(b) shows 
the opposite relationship between the initial, or counterfactual, level of inequality 
(in market income) and the percent reduction associated with net cash transfers. 
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Figure 6: Higher rates of inequality are related to greater point reductions in 
inequality but relationship doesn’t hold for percent reduction in inequality 
 
(a) Point reduction 
 
(b) Percent reduction 
 
Notes (see Figure 1 notes). 
Source: Author’s calculations based on data from the Luxembourg Income Study 
 
In the analysis we choose to focus on the percentage point reduction in the poverty 
rate and the point reduction in the Gini coefficient as we prefer the measure that 
gives greater weight to a reduction 50% to 25% than 10% to 5%. 
 
7.1 Poverty reduction 
 
If we treat each of our data points across the four countries as independent 
observations and plot the bivariate relationship between concentration and poverty 
reduction we obtain our first estimate of the relationship between the degree of 
concentration of net cash transfers and their effectiveness. In the all age population 
(Figure 7(a)) we find a negative relationship. This supports Korpi and Palme’s 
finding that greater concentration of net cash transfers is less effective at reducing 
poverty. However, although some of the data points fit closely to the best-fit line 
there is also considerable variation so that, for example a 20 percentage point 
reduction in poverty rates can be achieved where the concentration coefficient 
ranges from -0.7 to -0.3. Similarly restricting the analysis to the working age 
population (Figure 7(b)) also reveals a negative relationship between concentration 
and poverty reduction but there is considerable variation around the best-fit line. 
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Figure 7: Relationship between concentration of net cash transfers and 
reduction in at risk of poverty rates (percentage point reduction) 
 
(a) All age households 
 
(b) Working age households 
 
Notes (see Figure 1 notes). 
Source: Author’s calculations based on data from the Luxembourg Income Study 
 
If we take a different approach and examine the series within each country a 
dramatically clearer picture emerges (Figure 8). The within country analysis 
reveals a negative relationship between concentration and poverty reduction and 
although the size of the elasticities varies between the countries, it is much more 
convincing evidence. All of the coefficient estimates are positive in simple 
regressions. The relationship is highest in France (coefficient estimate) and weakest 
in Italy (both in terms of coefficient estimate and R2). Although in France there is 
very little variation in the concentration of cash transfers which, as noted earlier, 
are net of mandatory social contributions but not of income taxes. The points sit 
closest to the best fit line in the UK (R2 = 0.81). 
 
The arrows joining the data points point in the direction of time. Movement up and 
down the best fit line rather than simply moving in a single direction along a line 
provides more convincing evidence of a relationship between these two variables. 
The analysis for the working age population also shows a negative relationship 
within countries between the concentration of net cash transfers and poverty 
reduction – greater concentration is associated with lower poverty reduction 
(Figure 9). Compared to the all age population this relationship is weaker in the UK 
but the points sit closer to the best fit line in Italy and Sweden than for the all age 
population.  
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Figure 8: Relationship between concentration of net cash transfers and poverty reduction within countries (all age population) 
 
 
Source: Author’s calculations based on data from the Luxembourg Income Study 
Notes (see Figure 1 notes) 
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Figure 9: Relationship between concentration of net cash transfers and poverty reduction within countries (working age) 
 
 
Source: Author’s calculations based on data from the Luxembourg Income Study 
Notes (see Figure 1 notes)
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 7.2. Inequality reduction 
 
In this section we turn our attention to assessing the relationship between the 
concentration of net cash transfers and the reduction in income inequality measured by 
the difference (reduction) in Gini coefficients between market income and disposable 
income. 
 
Looking within countries we find a negative relationship between the degree of 
concentration of net cash transfers and the reduction in inequality in the all age 
population (Figure 10). The relationship is strongest and most clearly defined for the 
UK, followed by Sweden. Again the arrows, which point in the direction of time, show 
that observations move up and down the line and not simply in one direction. 
 
Note that for Italy the reduction in the Gini coefficient is the difference between 
inequality of net market income and disposable income and therefore shows the effect 
of gross cash transfers and misses the progressive effects of income tax and social 
contributions. 
 
In the working age population we also find a negative relationship between the 
concentration of net cash transfers and the point reduction in the Gini coefficient in UK, 
Sweden and France (Figure 11). In these countries during times when net cash transfers 
have been more concentrated on low income households a lower reduction in income 
inequality has been achieved. This finding does not hold for Italy; most likely because 
progressive taxation is not taken into account due to lack of data. 
 
 
 
Figure 10: Relationship between concentration of net cash transfers and point reduction in Gini coefficient within countries (all age 
population) 
 
Source: Author’s calculations based on data from the Luxembourg Income Study 
Notes (see Figure 1 notes) 
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Figure 11: Relationship between concentration of net cash transfers and point reduction in Gini coefficient within countries (working 
age) 
 
Source: Author’s calculations based on data from the Luxembourg Income Study 
Notes (see Figure 1 notes) 
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8.  Summary 
A number of recent studies have provided evidence which suggests that a net cash 
transfer system which targets cash transfers on low income households can be a 
more effective way to reduce inequality and income poverty than a system regarded 
as ‘universal’ in the sense that net cash transfers are more evenly received across 
the income distribution. This led to suggestions for a revision to the ‘Paradox of 
Redistribution’; Korpi and Palme’s 1998 finding that greater targeting of net cash 
transfers, measured in terms of concentration, is less effective at reducing poverty 
and inequality than ‘universal’ systems where cash transfers are received more 
evenly across the income distribution. Such a relationship provides an indication 
of how effective the welfare state is in assisting us at smoothing our own income 
over the lifecycle as much as redistribution between the wealthy and the 
disadvantaged at a point in time. Further research is required to assess how lifetime 
income inequality and income poverty reduction is associated with the 
concentration of cash transfers but this requires rich longitudinal data. 
 
Previous studies have relied on estimating the bivariate relationship between 
concentration of cash transfers and poverty or inequality reduction at the country-
level. Conclusions have been drawn on the basis of comparisons made between 
countries at a point in time, or at different points in time. 
 
The research reported in this paper contributes further evidence to this debate by 
looking at the relationship between poverty and inequality reduction and the 
concentration of net cash transfers, within four countries (UK, Sweden, France and 
Italy) over a period of time that spans four decades. 
 
The within country across time evidence presented does not support the case that 
greater targeting is more effective at reducing poverty or inequality. We offer a 
word of caution on the use of cross-country bivariate relationships to draw policy 
conclusions. Where data are available this type of analysis should at least be 
supplemented with analysis that looks within countries over time as a robustness 
check.  
 
We find that within countries during periods when net cash transfers have been 
more closely targeted (concentrated) on lower income households the reduction of 
income inequality and the incidence of poverty is generally lower. A key to 
understanding this relationship is the progressivity of direct taxation and in the 
cases where we find weak(er) evidence it is often associated with incomplete 
information on income taxes and social contributions. 
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